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A Woman’s Optics:
Margaret Cavendish, Sensory Mimesis, and Early Modern Rhetorics of Science
It is the great prerogative of Mankind above other Creatures, that we are
not only able to behold the works of Nature . . . but we have also the power
of considering, comparing, altering, assisting, and improving them to
various uses. And as this is the peculiar privilege of humane Nature in
general, so is it capable of being so far advanced by the helps of Art, and
Experience, as to make some Men excel others in their Observations, and
Deductions, almost as much as they do Beasts.
Robert Hooke, 1665, Micrographia, p. 1
But the all-powerful God, and his servant nature, know that art [artificial
means], which is but a particular creature, cannot inform us of the truth of
the infinite parts of nature, being but finite itself.
Margaret Cavendish, 1666b, Observations, p. 48
On May 30, 1667, the experimental methods of the Royal Society of London were
placed on display during a historic meeting. Robert Boyle, then Curator of Experiments,
set up a microscope and prepared to present a miniscule view of various natural elements
for that day’s meeting attendees. The experiments were meant to showcase what he and
fellow member of the Royal Society, Robert Hooke, considered as “the great prerogative
of Mankind,” that of beholding nature in its constitutive parts. Royal Society members, of
course, were no strangers to a microscopic view of matter, due to the rising popularity of
the device following the success of Robert Hooke’s Micrographia (1665), the
organization’s first major publication by one of its members. Nevertheless, the energy of
the room was more frenzied than usual that day, and Boyle had to halt his presentation,
as it was meant for the eyes of one particular observer who had yet to arrive. Rarely did
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the Royal Society extend invitations to non-members, but this visitor had composed an
emphatic critique of experimental natural philosophy, specifically the optics theorized in
Boyle and Hooke’s work. So everyone waited, hoping to proffer the undeniable benefits of
the microscope to their critic, Margaret Cavendish. Cavendish, however, would arrive
over an hour late, her words would be few, and it would be her last meeting at the Royal
Society.
When Cavendish accepted this invitation, she became the first woman to attend a
meeting at the Royal Society. Considering that women would not receive election to join
the organization until 1945 (Royal Society n.d.), Cavendish’s presence at this meeting
marks an important moment in histories and rhetorics of science. As Cavendish openly
and harshly critiqued the Royal Society’s epistemic practices in Observations (1666), she
did so at a time when most women’s opinions were all too easy to dismiss. Her marriage
to William Cavendish, however, afforded opportunities not usually extended to women in
early modern England: she became “Duchess of Newcastle,” gained entry into an elite
group of thinkers surrounding her husband known as the “Cavendish Circle, which would
regularly include the likes of Rene Descartes and Thomas Hobbes (Cunning 2017, para. 3),
and acquired the ability to publish and print her philosophical, scientific, and literary
work. 1 Of course, that central place in the public eye led to Cavendish’s reputation as little
more than a spectacle to her contemporaries (Lilley 1992, ix).

Tina Skouen and Ryan J. Stark report that Cavendish was “the first and the only
Englishwoman of the period to publish works in natural philosophy in her own name”
(Skouen and Stark, 2015, 13). A recent collection by Leah Knight, Micheline White, and
Elizabeth Sauer (2018), Women’s Bookscapes in Early Modern Britain, sheds light on the
writing, publishing, and reading practices of early modern women, and Julie Crawford
1
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Because of her social status and prolific authorship, members of the Society, such
as Samuel Pepys, continually sought and failed to make Cavendish’s acquaintance. Once
when she rode into the city, Pepys and a large crowd of others gathered to view her
arrival, but, Pepys described, “we could not, she being fallowed and crowded upon by
coaches all the way she went, that nobody could come near her” (1667, 196). Recognizing
her influence and knowing her “desire to be present at one of the meetings of the
Society,” another Society member and member of Parliament, Lord George Berkeley,
made a request on May 23, 1667 to extend a meeting invitation to Cavendish (Birch 1756,
176). Much debate ensued, as some feared that the event would make a mockery of the
Society (Mintz 1952, 171-72). Mockery or not, from the moment Berkeley’s request was
granted, everyone knew that the event would spark controversy throughout London.
When Cavendish did finally arrive on May 30, 1667, it was “with glorious train and
gilded coach, and horse with many a tassle” (Whitaker 2003, 299). She was met at the
door by the President of the Society, Lord Brouncker, and seated next to him for the
entirety of the meeting. Pepys and the other members watched Cavendish with intent
and eagerly awaited her response to Boyle’s experiments. Her reaction, they anticipated,
would be as fiery as her written critiques. Instead, as Pepys chronicles, “I [did not] hear
her say any thing that was worth hearing, but that she was full of admiration, all
admiration. . . . After they had shown her many experiments, and she cried still she was

uncovers how Cavendish was especially strategic in the distributing of her texts, ensuring
that certain university libraries maintained copies of her folios (Crawford, 2018, 114). This
care taken to consider the longevity of her work shows that Cavendish viewed her ideas as
compendiums to other established texts in the universities like Hooke’s.

4
full of admiration, she departed” (Pepys 1667, 243). Scholarly depictions of her
performance that day present Cavendish as “plagued by shyness” (Whitaker 2003, 290)
and “afflicted with her usual bashfulness” (Sutherland 1997, 269). This depiction of
Cavendish’s visit to the Royal Society as a let down has clouded how historians of rhetoric
interpret her scientific writing.
Cavendish is often considered a “practitioner of rhetoric,” one who aspired to the
rhetorical tradition but who “never developed a coherent theory of it” (Sutherland 1997,
255; Kennedy, 1999, 263). Rather, the rhetorical tradition running through early modern
England, George A. Kennedy explains, centered instead on Hobbes, Locke, and the “new
logic” of the Royal Society. Because this new Baconian logic was channeled through the
“plain” scientific prose of experimental philosophy, Cavendish’s stylistic flourishes and
“flights of fancy” were widely dismissed in her time (Stark 1999; Nate 2001). Hui Wu
further explains that the problem with studying Cavendish in contemporary rhetorical
scholarship is that her work does not quite “meet the criteria of [the] rhetorical tradition
and academic feminism” (2005, 171). I argue that finding Cavendish’s most substantial
contribution in the history of rhetoric may not come from examining the traditional
rhetorical artifacts that these scholars have queried, namely her novellas, poetry, and
general treatises. Instead, Cavendish’s contributions to rhetoric come to fore through her
scientific writing, through her critique of Hooke’s Micrographia, her reimagining of early
modern metaphysics, and her theorization of an alternative optics to counter that of the
Royal Society’s.
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Teasing out the details of this alternative optics requires, admittedly, a bit of
critical imagination. In Feminist Rhetorical Practices, Jacqueline Jones Royster and Gesa E.
Kirsch define critical imagination as a methodology employed to speculate on existing
evidence (2012, 71). The first step in employing critical imagination, they explain, is
“gathering whatever evidence can be gathered and ordering it in a configuration that is
reasonable and justifiable in accord with basic scholarly methodologies” (Royster and
Kirsch 2012, 71). The second step is then thinking “between, above, around, and beyond
this evidence to speculate methodically about probabilities” (Royster and Kirsch 2012, 71).
In the case of Cavendish, established evidence has centered almost exclusively on The
World’s Olio, Orations of Divers Sorts, and The Blazing World. However, gathering new
evidence through her theories of experimental philosophy explicated in Observations on
Experimental Philosophy reveals two unconsidered elements of her work to scholars in the
history of rhetoric and rhetorics of science. First, Cavendish’s famous debate with Hooke
and the Royal Society was primarily a contention centered on optics and new ways of
seeing emerging around the microscope. Second, the rhetorical and poetic concept of
mimesis offered Cavendish the epistemological confidence needed to critique the optics
of the Royal Society. Whereas the optics of the Royal Society created distance and
difference between the observer and the object of study, Cavendish’s optics would
connect the observer with the natural world through a theory of mimetic patterning.
Cavendish’s critiques of Renaissance epistemologies through her own alternative
science thus offers a new angle from which to consider what Jeanne Fahnestock has
argued in Rhetorical Figures in Science, namely that rhetorical concepts have structured
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scientific thinking, particularly in scientific paradigm shifts. Here, I argue that mimesis
helped Cavendish to anticipate a scientific epistemology more accessible to early modern
women in how the term allowed her to envision an expansion of agency in scientific study
that extended beyond the traditional scientific observer. To uncover the rhetorical
underpinnings of Cavendish’s optics, I first track Cavendish’s points of contention with
Hooke’s Micrographia, presenting her critique as itself a rhetoric of science, however one
concerned less with Hooke’s argumentation style as with his pedagogy of sight. Next, I
explicate Cavendish’s unique theory of optics based around her concept of “patterning,”
which I argue is an extension of rhetorical mimesis or “imitation.” Finally, I consider how
the rhetorical concept of mimesis allowed Cavendish to cast a skeptical glance at science
and imagine alternate ways of knowing that anticipated feminist science studies. Thus,
reviving Cavendish’s science offers an extended analysis of the rhetorical valences of one
woman’s embodied, material optics.
Artless Microscopy and the Bodily Work of Observation
With their motto “Nullius in verba,” which was translated as “take nobody’s word
for it” (Royal Society n.d., para. 3), notable members of the Royal Society soon became the
definitive authority among experimental philosophers after the establishment of the
learned collective in 1660. Its mission brought members like Boyle and Hooke to verify all
statements concerning the natural world through what Jordynn Jack calls “new empirical
evidence” to support their theories (Jack 2009, 194). In the case of the microscope, this
new empirical evidence derived from the ability to see the minutiae of matter. Hooke’s
first collection of microscopic images—Micrographia—showcased fleas, charcoal, and
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other natural entities through refractive lenses, as seen in
Figures 1 and 2, and presented the idea that technological
instruments like the microscope extended the human
senses, rendering visible elements of matter that were
previously imperceptible. Accompanying Hooke’s images,
Jack explains, was a “pedagogy of sight” that instructed
viewers how to interpret images through the Royal Society’s
epistemic framework. The microscope, and the ways of
seeing emerging alongside it, required that scientists
related to their objects mechanistically. Only premises that
could be mechanistically observed were considered as the
kind of “proof” necessary to validate one’s hypothesis.

Figure 1. The Eyes of a Grey
Drone-Fly.
(Hooke 1665, 252)

Only aristocratic, educated males,
however, or those who comprised the
membership of the Royal Society, were extended
the opportunity to use these scientific tools for
intellectual ends—an exclusivity that often
prevented women and people of lower classes
from wielding argumentative authority. In effect,

Figure 2. Observation of a Flea.
(Hooke 1665, 307)

historian Eve Keller argues, the microscope was
therefore less about discovering the “truth” of nature and more about producing men as
“petty gods” (1997, 467). In turn, Cavendish’s antagonism with the Royal Society had less
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to do with what could be seen by the microscope and more to do with the “pride of place
that she saw some experimentalists giving to empirical observation” (Marshall 2016, xii).
This pride of place, too, brings Alan Gross to describe Micrographia as deliberative
rhetoric, in part didactic science, but largely an exhortation for readers to support the
ideals of the Royal Society (2016, 17-18). That is, Micrographia was less a scientific manual
than a persuasive text designed to show the Royal Society and its natural philosophers as
trusted and respected discoverers of “God’s handiwork” (Gross, 2016, 19).
By zeroing in on the Society’s first major publication, Cavendish signaled that her
message not only targeted Hooke’s “artificial means” via the microscope, but also the
epistemological foundations of this emerging science. Cavendish thus entered into larger
Renaissance conversations regarding the relationship between “art” and nature as well as
the origins of knowledge itself. Historian of early modern philosophy Sarah Hutton
depicts this particular historical moment as “a time of enormous intellectual ferment,” a
time when predominant Aristotelian paradigms of knowledge were being challenged by
the emergent philosophies of Descartes, Hobbes, and others (2003, 186-187). These new
philosophies questioned whether and how human knowledge could be certain of that
which it ascertained. At least for Cavendish, the main foci of these debates—the
relationship between art and nature, the status of knowledge, and the role of sensation in
knowledge—converged in the technology of the microscope. The microscope became a
nexus on which Cavendish could base an alternative scientific epistemology and theory of
optics.

9
In Observations, Cavendish leveled a three-fold critique against Hooke’s optics in
Micrographia: 1) the degree of authority given to “art”; 2) the depiction of the human
senses as in need of extension and correction through microscopy, a tenet that disavowed
contemplative philosophy as a reputable method of scientific inquiry; 3) the claim that
nature’s “internal substance” could be derived from microscopic images. As she engaged
with Hooke, Cavendish argued that attentive sensing could lead to reputable scientific
discoveries. If Hooke contended that theorists must use microscopy to contribute to
scientific knowledge, then Cavendish would theorize an optics in which observation was
not a specialization, and in which the apparatus used to discover scientific truths was
natural to both men and women. According to Cavendish’s scientific epistemology, the
truest knowledge came primarily through the body’s biological way of sensing, through
the lenses of the eye, rather than through mechanical instruments. 2
The Authority of “Art”
In the opening of Observations, Cavendish quoted a portion of Hooke’s preface in
Micrographia to center her critique and expose Hooke’s belief that human sensation was
prone to error, able to lead the mind toward inaccurate reasoning. Here, I include that

Cavendish’s engagement with Hooke was certainly a matter of “optics.” Although
modern conceptions of optics relate to physics—reflection, refraction, and how light
enters the eye—this shift in focus from sight to light is a relatively recent occurrence in
the history of optics, explains historian A. Mark Smith. Smith traces the etymology of the
Greek optika to opteu𝑜𝑜 (“to see”) and both words to 𝑜𝑜ps (“eye”) (2015, 25). Only with
Kepler’s theorization of the retinal image, Smith argues, did the study of optics become
more concerned with light than with sight. In early modern England, then, Cavendish
would have conceived of her explication of Hooke’s way of seeing and her own theory of
visual perception as a theory of optics.
2
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section of Hooke’s preface at length to show the repetitive insistence on the “mischiefs,”
“imperfections,” and “errors” of the senses by which “art” is meant to make reparation:
By the addition of such artificial Instruments and methods, there may be, in some
manner, a reparation made for the mischiefs, and imperfection, mankind has
drawn upon it self, by negligence, and intemperance, and a wilful and superstitious
deserting the Prescripts and Rules of Nature, whereby every man, both from a
deriv’d corruption, innate and born with him, and from his breeding and converse
with men, is very subject to slip into all sorts of errors. (Hooke 1665, 1)
Only the scientific expert—the one who has properly applied reason and artificial means
to nature—Hooke’s epistemology entailed, might come to accurate scientific conclusions.
Cavendish maintained, in her rebuttal to the passage, that reparations are not so easily
made, precisely because all “art” was as finite as the conclusions of a sensing human
observer. Cavendish would instead emphasize the finitude of “art,” as she put it: “But the
all-powerful God, and his servant nature, know, that art, which is but a particular
creature, cannot inform us of the truth of the infinite parts of nature, being but finite
itself” (Cavendish 1666b, 5). The artificial, according to Cavendish, could never supersede
the natural.
If one central question guided Cavendish’s thought in Observations it was to what
extent art could alter nature, suggests historian of philosophy Susan James (James, 2018,
31). According to Aristotelian metaphysics, art could imitate nature, but not equal or
surpass it (James, 2018, 31). Hooke’s microscopy contended instead that art could indeed
transform nature, insisting that by artificial means, “the Heavens are open’d, . . . and new
Productions appear in them, to which the ancient Astronomers were utterly Strangers”
(Hooke, 1665, 4). According to Cavendish, however, microscopes offered a view of life in
cross section, a partial perspective that “doth more easily alter than inform” (Cavendish
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1666b, 50). Such microscopic slices on which Hooke and others based their reasoning was
not “pure nature,” but what Cavendish called “hermaphroditical mixtures,” termed as
such because the results of microscopy were, as she put it, “partly natural, and partly
artificial” (Cavendish 1666b, 197). Of course, definitions of where nature ended and art
began were quite blurry for Renaissance thinkers, and for Cavendish, the more
fundamental question was whether such lines should be drawn in the first place.
As with other foundational ideas in the “new logic” of the Royal Society, a
touchstone in art/nature distinctions can be found in the work of Francis Bacon. As
historian Sophie Weeks details, Bacon authored careful redefinitions of “nature” and “art”
as he challenged the traditional Aristotelian narrative of art as imitative of nature (Weeks,
2007, 106). As Weeks purports, nature, according to Bacon, had endless possibilities, of
which only one possibility might be actualized at a time. Art brought to fore those
alternative possibilities, evoking that which lay nascent. The ultimate goal of Bacon’s new
science, then, was to “obliterate nature’s habitual courses” through “the systematic
unveiling of [its] hidden facets” (Weeks, 2007, 128). The problem for Cavendish was not
that art could reveal nature but that art came to be seen as the best, if not the only,
method for revealing nature. Nature, in other words, was stripped of the power to reveal
itself, to speak in its own right. And if nature could not speak directly to human intuition,
then, among other implications, women had no means by which to listen.
In looking at how Hooke theorized from the slices of life offered by mechanical
means, Cavendish perceived how a hierarchy might emerge in the relationship between
scientists and their objects of study. In championing how the microscope extended the
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senses and granted dominion over nature, Royal Society members like Hooke were, at
least in Cavendish’s estimation, forgetting their own status as finite parts of the same
nature” they sought to understand, suggests historian and philosopher of science Ian
Lawson (2015, 595). Anaesthetizing what was placed beneath the microscope, dissecting
life and bringing it to stillness, allowed the scientist to emerge as seemingly the only
active agent in scientific encounters. To be clear, Cavendish’s difficulty was not so much
with only seeing a slice of the object as with how the object was primarily studied in its
static, specimen-form as well as how such a slice seemed to ignore the synoptic
environment from which the object was extracted. 3 For Cavendish, truth of the natural
world could only be ascertained if objects were studied in their living form, moving
throughout its environment and interacting with the other agents therein.
Hobbes, the thinker who perhaps had the most influence on Cavendish’s own
natural philosophy and who pushed against the metaphysics of the Royal Society as
staunchly as Cavendish, would also make the relationship between art and nature central
to his philosophy. 4 This relationship was perhaps best captured in Hobbes’s analogy of

Hooke’s theory of vision, it should also be noted, was not altogether different
from Cavendish’s. Christa Knellwolf explains that for Hooke, vision was “a mechanical
process of registering corpuscular light which, in the mind, produces Ideas which he
‘suppose[s] to be material and bulky’” (Knellwolf 2001, 195). Ian Lawson further argues
that “Hooke’s aim was never to . . . share with his readers . . . a realistic impression of
sight with a microscope, but his privileged knowledge of the microworld” (Lawson 2016,
39). The key difference in their respective optics is that Hooke had no conception of sense
organs as patterning objects’ internal motion.
3

Hobbes, it seems, was at least Cavendish’s earliest philosophical influence, according to
Eileen O’Neill. Hobbes served as her husband’s tutor in his youth, and Hobbes remained
close to the family thereafter as a main figure of the “Newcastle Circle” and as the
Newcastle family served as his patrons (O’Neill, 1998; Detleftsen, 2007). Remnants of

4
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the “artificial man,” which posited that the mechanical, mathematical laws that govern
the universe may also govern human behavior (Ankers 2003, 246). Art as part of nature
allowed humans to work within nature, to bring nature to its best possible end (Walton
1987, 71). Case in point was how Hobbes considered rhetoric as one such art that might
perfect humans’ natural tendencies. Arts like rhetoric, argues historian of rhetoric Ned
O’Gorman, served as a means for transcending and thus overcoming what Hobbes
considered as humans’ “hostile natural condition” (O’Gorman 2013, 5). As O’Gorman
further explains, rhetoric, for Hobbes, “does not improve upon nature so much as recreate
a natural pattern on an artificial plane so as to overcome what ‘evill men’ do naturally
(O’Gorman 2013, 5). Artificial man, that individual able to overcome his nature, thus
became a model of civil society, one in which nature, the individual, and society were
unified (Ankers 2003, 246). Obeying authority, the idea went, was like obeying the laws of
nature, and obeying the laws of nature was conforming to an inevitable, immutable logic
(Ankers 2003, 247). Such emphasis on mechanism, however, brought Cavendish to
consider artificial man as an analogy that sought to limit nature. Cavendish’s philosophy,
then, would take Hobbes’s “artificial man” analogy and counter it to depict nature as an
agential actor. As Neil Ankers shows: “Cavendish appropriates Hobbes’s ‘artificial man’
analogy and applies it to nature rather than to the nation state or ‘commonwealth’”

Hobbes’s materialism is evident as a central undercurrent in Cavendish’s thought, yet she
went to great lengths to distance herself from him, writing against his theories at times
and denying that she knew him well at others. Once Cavendish even wrote that she had
never read more than 20 words of Hobbes (Hutton, 1997).
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(Ankers 2003, 247). That is, nature was given the non-mechanical agency and autonomy
of human individuals (Ankers 2003, 247).
The issue of agency in the relationship between art and nature was of utmost
importance to Cavendish precisely because of her positionality as “Mad Madge,” or as a
woman without formal education whose ideas were rarely taken seriously. The artificial
powers for overcoming nature—such as rhetoric or the mechanical means of the
microscope—were not as fully afforded to her. By Hobbes’s and Hooke’s systems,
Cavendish could never achieve the status of “artificial man.” The competing
epistemologies circulating in Renaissance thought, explains historian Eileen O’Neill, all
entailed gendered mechanisms that discredited women’s ways of knowing and “all [had]
in common the habit of ignoring and disparaging the experience and reality of women”
(O’Neill, 1998, 95). Cavendish’s metaphysics, then, would have to be one in which the
powers of rhetoric and the powers of observation, here inextricable, were afforded
through nature itself—a metaphysics in which nature, and thus natural ways of knowing,
were in need of no perfecting.
The Knowledge of Sensation
Of all the thinkers who contested the philosophical and scientific work of the
Royal Society as it was emerging, Cavendish’s critique was the one that “constitutes the
century’s most dramatic attempt to bend the discourse of [the Royal Society] to a radical
cultural end,” according to literary studies scholar John Rogers (1996, 181). 5 Cavendish’s
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Many elements of the Royal Society’s philosophical and scientific views were
under contestation in Cavendish’s “attempt to bend [their] discourse.” Here particularly
Rogers is speaking of the Society’s “monistic materialism,” or the idea that all matter is
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particular style of scientific inquiry has been defined as “full-scale skepticism” (Sarasohn
1984, 292), a “science of the fancy” meant to “restore the balance in an age of reason”
(Bowerbank 1984, 406). Because, as Lisa T. Sarasohn puts it, “the path to conventional
knowledge was closed to her” (1984, 292), Cavendish subverted established scientific
epistemologies and practices, calling into question what science was and who could be
considered a scientist. Whereas the experimental philosophers of the Royal Society
sought methods for approaching nature through systematic and mechanical means,
Cavendish practiced imaginative, speculative, and embodied ways of knowing, and her
“justification for her lack of method [was] that she recreate[d] pure nature” (Bowerbank
1984, 396). For Cavendish, arriving at the truth of nature could only come through direct
sensory encounters with natural phenomena, discovering nature through biological
apparatuses, not “artistic” means like the microscope.
In a time in which the status of knowledge itself was subject to debate, Cavendish
saw an opportunity to put forth imaginative, intuitive, and embodied ways of sensing and
knowing as reputable methods of inquiry. “If no one can know anything absolutely,”
Sarasohn articulates, “then there was no reason why [Cavendish’s] speculations might not
be as correct or more correct than anyone else’s” (Sarasohn, 1984, 292-293). This instance
on skepticism emerged at the time in which epistemology—that inquiry into what

composed of a single element that was subordinated and organized by God (Rogers 1996,
6). In contrast to monistic materialism, Cavendish adopted a “vitalist” view of matter.
Vitalism contended that all matter was composed of self-moving, animate matter and
that these many elements of matter might not always cohere into a unified whole
(Marshall 2016, xvi). Other scholars define Cavendish’s view of matter as “panpsychist”
(Broad 2011, 459). Still others define it as “vitalist materialism” (Boyle 2018, 62-63).
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knowledge was, where it came from, and how humans could be certain of it—was
becoming central in Renaissance thought. Yet epistemology was becoming central,
historian Richard H. Popkin explains, precisely because skeptics like Cavendish
continually leveled challenges against every new way of thinking (Popkin 1988, 684). 6
Established Aristotelian thought detailed that knowledge was first attained through
sensory activity, then abstracted into objects via the intellect, and finally known
conceptually. As we know, natural philosophers in the vein of the Royal Society broke
with this theory and argued that individuals must develop “a special power for
experiencing or apprehending the real nature of things” (Popkin 1988, 677), such special
powers coming, of course, from experimental methods and artificial means. Still others
called into question whether any human knowledge could be certain. Whereas NeoPlatonists contended that full knowledge could never be acquired because that
knowledge exceeded our human finitude, skeptics maintained that “perfect knowledge of
a thing” might arrive “by immediate intuitive apprehension” (Popkin 1988, 673; 682).
Erring on the side of this synoptic, intuitive knowledge, Cavendish would find the
knowledge claims of natural philosophers too limited by their selections, or slices of life.
Cavendish’s contention with Hooke and the Royal Society’s experimental natural
philosophy was that observation through microscopy, or artificial means, disallowed

In many respects, Cavendish’s theories parallel the ideas expressed by Francisco
Sanches, the skeptic and cousin of Michel de Montaigne, who argued that true scientific
knowledge could never be acquired because all that humans could attain was “a limited
knowledge of some things in the present” (Popkin, 1988, 682). The revised skepticism of
Sanches and Montaigne, Popkin contends, became the challenge that must be met for
those philosophers seeking a new foundation of knowledge (Popkin, 1988, 684).

6
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individuals to sense the “whole” of natural phenomena. Hooke would maintain that
without artificial means it was impossible to have complete understanding of nature: “Not
having a full sensation of the Object, we must be very lame and imperfect in our
conceptions of it, and in all the propositions which we built upon it” (Hooke 1665, 2,
emphasis added). “Full sensation” was not something of which the human sensory
apparatus was capable, Hooke would insist. And this fallibility of the senses would further
impact the mechanism of memory and the mind: “Thus all uncertainty, and mistakes of
humane actions, proceed either from the narrowness and wandring of our Senses, from
the slipperiness or delusion of our Memory, [or] from the confinement or rashness of our
Understanding” (Hooke 1665, 3). Properly wedding the senses to reason, or
understanding, through “art” would bring experimental philosophers to more truthful
methods of induction. In order to counter this epistemology, Cavendish would trouble
this relationship to the senses and query whether and how knowledge could be acquired
through sensation. For in Cavendish’s estimation, knowledge that came through natural
processes like sensation must be credited if her mimetic epistemology or methods like
contemplative philosophy could ever be legitimized.
Her rebuttal was that extending the senses through “art” provided no such
infallible reason or understanding. As she would reiterate, because “art” is “apt to delude
sense,” it “cannot inform so well as reason doth” (Cavendish 1666b, 47). Cavendish further
problematized Hooke’s sense/reason hypothesis by insisting that “sense, which is more
apt to be deluded than reason, cannot be the ground of reason, no more than art
[artificial means] can be the ground of nature. . . . For how can a fool order his
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understanding by art, if nature has made [his understanding] defective?” (Cavendish
1666b, 49). To put it another way, even though artificial means extended the senses, they
were still subject to the fallibility of the senses. Unable to bring a scientist beyond sense,
the microscope could not bring them beyond reason either. Consider, she asked of her
readers, the widely varying results experimental philosophers accrued when they set out
to observe the same objects at different times throughout the day. If truth were to be
discoverable through the microscope, then it should not be altered given different
conditions, as Cavendish lamented: “Artists do confess themselves, that flies, and the like,
will appear of several figures or shapes, according to the several reflections, refractions,
mediums and positions of several lights; which if so, how can they tell or judge which is
the truest light, position, or medium, that doth present the object naturally as it is?”
(Cavendish 1666b, 51). In so many words, Cavendish argued that with the variability of the
natural world, replicability with these early microscopes would be nearly impossible.
Thus experimental philosophers, in her estimation, should not declare that they have
observed nature in its “true form” if they are unable to replicate their observations. “Art,”
merely a tool for gathering different information from the natural world, could not
provide holistic or more truthful information. Through their tools, experimental
philosophers might better understand the molecular components of matter, but they
were only able to say that matter was composed of minute building blocks, not how or
why they contained them. For Cavendish, knowing more did not entail knowing better,
and it certainly did not mean knowing all.
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The intuitive, synoptic method of knowing favored by Cavendish was a
contemplative philosophy—a way of knowing through reflection that Hooke frequently
dismissed as unable to make valuable contributions to science. Hooke expressed his
distaste for contemplative philosophy in Micrographia when he cautioned: “The truth is,
the Science of Nature has been already too long made only a work of the Brain and the
Fancy: It is now high time that it should return to the plainness and soundness of
Observations on material and obvious things” (Hooke 1665, 5). He further remarked that
any observer must “make use of the same method by the Senses,” via deduction through
the microscope, if they were to contend with his experimental findings or “venture to
compare the reality and the usefulness of his services, towards the true Philosophy, with
those other men, that are of much stronger, and more acute speculations” (Hooke 1665,
5). In other words, the apparatuses used to validate scientific hypotheses were no longer
found in biological ways of sensing or in everyday ways of seeing. Instead, such validation
was to be found only in mechanical apparatuses. To mark microscopy and other
experimental tools as the only valid means by which to remark upon natural philosophy
specialized the field and placed its authority beyond the reach for many in early modern
England.
With this new requirement for specialization, women, who already had little
access to education, much less to optical tools, would find themselves even further
removed from the realm of scientific knowledge. Cavendish reacted to this specialization
by asking experimental philosophers to extend women the chance to stand on the same
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epistemic ground. And she anticipated Hooke and other philosophers’ critiques as she
entreated:
Whether [women] would find out the philosophers’ stone, I doubt; for our sex is
more apt to waste, than to make gold: However, I would have them try, especially
those that have means to spend; for who knows but women might be more happy
in finding it out, than man; and then would men have reason to employ their time
in more profitable studies than in useless experiments. (Cavendish 1666b, 106)
Cavendish here suggested that should women pursue experimental natural philosophy,
then men could go on to apply their reason for other, more “important” sociocultural
matters. Women, after all, have access to the sensory system just as much as men, and
should they thus become a resource for scientific inquiry, men need no longer waste their
time tinkering with “artificial means.”
To clarify, Cavendish did not entirely disagree with Hooke—she believed the
microscope to be a useful tool for providing previously unconsidered views of natural
phenomena. Indeed, scientists should use tools like the microscope to observe what they
could not otherwise see. They should not, however, treat artificial observations as the
only infallible records of truth, or imply that the human senses are in need of “reparation”
or “purification.” Therein lay Cavendish’s second major point of critique: the values
experimental philosophers ascribed to new ways of seeing through the microscope, to the
“pride of place” that came to be extended to empirical observation and that thus belittled
other ways of knowing the surrounding world. 7 Unlike Hooke, who offered readers of

Literary scholar Tita Chico argues that Cavendish was in error when she
pinpointed the weakness of the microscope. Cavendish was one who “implies that
microscopes are a kind of plaything that have little to do with accurate perception,”
according to Chico (2006, 151). But such inaccuracy would have enamored experimental
philosophers, as it proved the “monstrosity of nature”—to use Daston and Galison’s
7
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Micrographia a practicum on how to reason through the microscope, Cavendish would
offer readers of her Observations ways to speculate around epistemic theories and
understand the natural world by attuning to it.
The Internal Substance of Natural Phenomena
If historians wish to find Cavendish’s place in the history of ideas, they must
consult her understanding of matter, which was more agential and vitalist than her
counterparts, argues historian of science and philosophy Karen Detlefsen (Detlefsen 2018,
75). Because she distanced herself from Hobbes and Hooke in regard to distinctions
between art and nature and the status of knowledge more generally, she would have to
theorize a new understanding of matter as well. Recall that Hooke and Hobbes conveyed
nature as mechanical and passive, that which could be revealed by human, artificial
means. To counter this definition and infuse a greater sense of agency in nature,
Cavendish would first have to show the limits of their mechanistic materialism. Her final
point of contention with Hooke’s Micrographia, then, was what exactly could come into
view through the refractive lens of the microscope, what empirical philosophers could
and could not view through the eyepiece.
Hooke’s stance was that artificial means brought the internal substance of matter
to view, or “the subtilty of the composition of Bodies, the structure of their parts, the
various texture of their matter, the instruments and manner of their inward motions” to

phrase (2010, 67). Perception was indeed the issue for Cavendish, but her disavowal of the
microscope had less to do with the importance of the scientific tool as with who was
given access to reason through its means, whose perception mattered. If microscopy came
to be the only valued observation, then women’s observations through contemplative
philosophy would come to be dismissed.
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light (Hooke 1665, 21). By contrast, Cavendish was adamant that the microscope could
only observe the external aspects of objects under study. Internal substance—or the
unique patterns subsisting within an object, giving the object its vitality—was not
something that could be assessed through microscopy. Hooke, and most other
experimental philosophers, would not entertain this point, but on this idea Cavendish
placed her only direct assurance in Observations. “Of this I am confident,” she stated,
“that this same art, with all its instruments, is not able to discover the interior natural
motions of any part or creature of nature” (Cavendish 1666b, 50, emphasis added).
Motion, as we will see, was of vital importance for Cavendish’s optics and theory of
matter—motion not passively imparted from another source, as was the case in Hobbes’s
mechanistic materialism, but motion actively initiated from within matter itself. The
microscope, by contrast, required that motion be stilled, a requirement that brings
Frédérique Aït-Touati to call Hooke’s microscopic images “still lives,” as in still life
paintings (Aït-Touati 2011, 150). Therefore, for Cavendish, if the internal substance of
matter was vital, living, and moving, then observing a static slice of those objects could
never fully convey that vitality.
Sarasohn pinpoints the beginnings of this vital materialism in Cavendish’s
Philosophical Letters (1664) through her contradictions of Hobbes’s mechanistic
materialism (Sarasohn 2003, 41). Like Hobbes, Cavendish believed that matter was in
constant in motion—the two thinkers diverged, however, when it came to “the extent to
which matter and mankind may be described as free, either to move or to choose”
(Sarasohn 2003, 41). In Hobbesian materialism, particles did not move in and of
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themselves; physical causation was required for particles to hit one another (Sarasohn
2003, 46). Cavendish’s materialism, on the other hand, assigned traits to matter usually
associated with human agency: “it moves, it senses, it reasons, it is free” (Detlefsen 2007,
188). This freedom, Sarasohn further explains, is extended because of matter’s self-moving
tendencies (Sarasohn 2003, 48). Placing matter in self-moving motion not only extended
radical agency to nature, but in doing so also extended greater agency and reputability to
women in their “natural state.” Cavendish authored such theories for just that reason:
“the actual world [she] lived in was not free and natural” (Sarasohn 2003, 53). Instead, her
social world “resembled more closely Thomas Hobbes’s artificial state where motion, and
freedom, is constrained” (Sarasohn 2003, 53). It was this vital materialism that allowed
Cavendish to speculate around the mechanistic fate of women in early modern England
and anticipate alternate epistemologies.
Cavendish thus turned to contemplative philosophy as the best method for
studying interiors, and the human eye—without interference from artificial means—was
shown as the best method for studying exteriors. The human eye, for Cavendish, was
more than just its faulty lens—it was a networked, holistic system inextricable from
cognition. As she explained, “The best optic is a perfect natural eye, and a regular
sensitive perception; and the best judge, is reason; and the best study, is rational
contemplation joined with the observations of regular sense, but not deluding arts”
(Cavendish 1666b, 53, emphasis added). With each additional artificial lens of the
microscope, there was more opportunity for distortion. And those most susceptible to the
danger of the microscope were those who were unaware of what was and was not
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distorted, namely women and individuals of lower classes who lacked access to the
education and empirical tools needed to test their hypotheses.
To present a theory of sensation (and perception) that allowed those with artificial
means to adequately peer into nature’s internal substance, Cavendish would create her
own optics, an optics involving less visual distortion and privileging everyday ways of
seeing. This optics would extend ancient theories of sight through a redefinition of
mimesis in order to explain a radical agency that considered an inner life or vitality within
every physical entity. It would maintain that seeing the physical structure of objects
through a microscope did not equate to knowing their vitality. It would maintain that any
human observer could witness the vitality of natural phenomena without artificial means.
Finally, it would theorize a practice for seeing and languaging alongside natural
phenomena—rather than reasoning about, outside, or around them—a practice
Cavendish would come to call “patterning.”
Patterned Optics and Sensory Mimesis
To base experimental conclusions only on microscopic views risked ignoring the
holistic body surrounding that material viewed in cross section. Indeed, the foundational
idea underlying Cavendish’s optics was a certain notion that matter consisted of vital—
possibly agential—energy. A fundamental premise underlying her contention with
Hooke’s optics was that the human was not the only active participant in scientific
observation. Matter, too, that “stuff” that made up the building blocks of “objects,” was
also moving, living, speaking. As this section details, matter became an actor in
Cavendish’s scientific epistemology, an epistemology displaying an agential personhood
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of sorts that attempted to expand agency beyond the mechanistic systems of Hobbes and
Hooke. Cavendish’s optics, then, hoped for a way of seeing in which both observer and
the object of study existed in a synoptical network of relations. Such synopsis derived not
from a bird’s eye view or a “still life,” but instead from recognition that human visual
perception was indebted to a multiplicity of acting agents. This expansive agency was part
of the reason that mimesis—here the drama that unfolded in nature and the process that
structured the “communicative” practices among and between agents in nature—played a
central role in Cavendish’s optics. Not often does a theory of optics intersect with the
history of rhetoric, but here a scientific epistemology is made possible because the
rhetorical concept of mimesis could be molded to expand agency in early modern
metaphysics.
To theorize vision as viewing the vitality of matter and as a sensory process rooting
human observers in their bodies, Cavendish defined sight as the “pattern[ing] out” of
“perceptive motions in the optic sense” (Cavendish 1666b, 147). For Cavendish, “patterns”
had to do with the ability of sense organs to create internal motions in the form of a
pattern of a perceived external object (Cunning 2019, 18). What exactly was “patterned
out” by the eye had to do with the vital internal substance of particular objects. 8
According to Cavendish, every object was composed of a certain vital makeup, and that

The idea of “patterning” may also evoke notions of quilt making. Much research
has been written on quilting as a feminist embodied and communicative practice—see,
for example, Elsley (1990), Fisk (2012), and Witkowski (2014). Most relative to this study is
biologist Maura C. Flannery’s (2011) depiction of quilting as a feminist metaphor for how
scientific inquiry may most ethically progress.
8
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vitality manifested though “internal motions” performed as part of its being (there).
Vision occured when an observer detected the internal pattern being performed by an
object and relayed that patterned performance to the mind. This process of mimetic
patterning ensured for Cavendish that every observer was indebted to the synoptic
performance of their object of study, in contradistinction to Hooke’s optics that would
place the human observer as viewing only a portion of the object in miniscule form. Not
only did Cavendish resist the static specimen beneath the microscope, she further
resisted a static observation, calling attention instead to the bodily, sensing work required
of the observer. In this optics of patterning and ever-changing, ever-in-flux motion,
seeing became more imitation than observation.
From her earliest writings, the rhetorical concept of mimesis, or “imitation,” as she
often called it, was central to how Cavendish conceived of sensation, especially visual
perception. Yet, in keeping with the rhetorical tradition of her time, Cavendish learned
the concept of mimesis in the context of rhetoric and poetics. That is, the primary use of
“imitation” in The World’s Olio involved the traditional rhetorical notion of imitation as a
“copy.” As she put it: “A good Imitation is good, and Those are to be commended that
copy well an excellent original” (Cavendish 1655, Book II, Part i). “Yet,” Cavendish
continued, clarifying that patterns are what individuals copy during imitation, “it
expresseth want of Invention that They cannot draw without a Pattern.” Later in The
World’s Olio, Cavendish spoke again of the differences between imitation and invention,
in that instance mentioning “Rhetorick” specifically (Cavendish 1655, Book II, Part i).
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Cavendish nevertheless employed the concept of “imitation” in a different valence
elsewhere in the treatise to explain how the mind processes information from the senses:
There is nothing in the understanding, that is not first in the senses. . . . The senses
bring all the materials into the brain, and then the brain cuts and divides them,
and gives them quite other forms, then the senses many times presented them. . . .
When the brain works upon her own materials, and at home, it is called poetry
and invention, but when the brain receives and words journey-work, which is not
of its own materials, then it is called learning, and imitation. (Cavendish 1655,
Book I, Part i)
This passage shows the early stages of Cavendish’s theory of mimetic patterning, with the
brain receiving and imitating materials “which [are] not its own.”
Mimesis in ancient rhetoric most often references the use of a paradigm case that
is imitated by a student. 9 Of course, Cavendish was not the first to turn to mimesis for its
malleability in describing the fluid demarcations between external phenomena and
internal perception. Historians of rhetoric generally identify three meanings for mimesis:
the Platonic notion of images as copies of ideal truth; the Aristotelian notion of poetics as
representations of human action; and the pedagogical notion of copying, simulating, or
emulating models (Corbett 1971, 243; Farrell 1986, 8-11; Haskins 2000). Eric Havelock
admits, however, that mimesis may be “the most baffling of all words in [Plato’s]
philosophic vocabulary,” given how the philosopher initially applied the term to drama
but then “seems to enlarge [the term] to cover several other phenomena” (Havelock 1982,

There is much evidence to suggest that Cavendish would have had a robust
understanding of ancient rhetorical writers and thus conceptions of mimesis. In her
analysis of Cavendish’s books, Crawford uncovers the expert knowledge Cavendish had of
ancient Greek and Roman authors like Plutarch, Thucydides, and Livy, authors of whom
Cavendish often denied having knowledge (Crawford 2018, 95). Crawford argues that
Cavendish’s reticence in that regard signaled a certain political positioning.
9
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20). Addressing the various iterations of the term in ancient rhetoric, John Muckelbauer
articulates that mimesis captured “the dynamics through which [a] model is encountered
in order to be imitated, in order to produce some kind of copy” (Muckelbaur 2003, 67).
Beyond the reproduction or variation of a model, mimesis also addressed the idea of
inspiration, of change evoked from the model (Muckelbaur 2003, 83-85). In describing the
ancient rhetorical aspect of mimesis relating to inspiration, Muckelbauer captures the
essence of Cavendish’s own expansion of the term. This aspect of mimesis introduced a
complication to “the dialectical relation between subjects and their models”
(Muckelbauer 2003, 83). As Muckelbauer explains, “the model here is not encountered as
content at all. . . . Instead, in the act of inspiration, the model transmits only inspiration
itself, it transmits the very capacity to be carried out of oneself” (Muckelbauer 2003, 8586). Muckelbauer finds this articulation of mimesis in how ancient writers spoke of the
muses, but the idea of a transmission of inspiration, a transmission of sensory
information rather than exact representation, is certainly echoed in Cavendish’s own use
of the term. As her theory of sensory mimesis implied, human observers come to “know”
non-human matter not through the literal copying of their patterns, but through
imitation of them.
In turning to mimesis, Cavendish not only harnessed the concept’s roots in ancient
rhetoric but also participated in the Renaissance uses of the term that informed theories
of personhood, including Hobbes’s “artificial man.” Such theories of personhood, explains
historian Quentin Skinner, contended with how an individual could act in or bear the
name of someone else, or, in Hobbes’s case, the commonwealth (1999, 6). And in the time
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of Hobbes and Cavendish the idea of acting in the name of another was caught up with
the “dramatis personae on the stage” (Skinner 1999, 6), which implied various layers of
mimesis in personhood, i.e, where the “natural” ended and performance, or the “artificial”
began. As Skinner shows, mimesis became central to Hobbes’s theory of man, as Hobbes
wrote: “a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common
Conversation” (1999, 6). In other words, all the world was a stage to Hobbes, and this idea
circulated widely in his time (Skinner 1999, 12). Whether Cavendish’s adoption of mimesis
to define sensation and agential matter derived from Hobbes is less important than
knowing that the concept of performance was a powerful social idea that fell on
interested ears during her time. Staging in the seventeenth century, drama scholar
Rebecca D’Monte further explains, lent itself to theories of personhood and identity
because performance was seen as a way to recreate the self (2003, 109). For Hobbes,
mimesis allowed man to overcome his natural state. For Cavendish, mimesis offered a
way to rethink early modern metaphysics.
Cavendish’s reappropriation of the term for scientific use, presented mimesis, or—
in this case—mimetic patterning, as opponent to the recreation or reproduction of
objects through mechanical means, and proponent to the rhetorical encounter in which
the seer imitates, and thus more immediately responds to, objects in the natural world.
To put it another way, Cavendish’s optics might have been based on mimesis, but did not
presume that vision directly represented the outside world. Instead, to see was to perform
an internal conception of the outside world. In defining vision as “patterns of motion,”
seeing became less a process of acting on an object but acting with that object.
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In Philosophical Fancies (1653), written just two years prior to The World’s Olio,
Cavendish worked out her conception of how sensation was the process wherein the
mind copied patterns from material objects. There, she described this unique “pattern” of
vital movement within objects as dancers on a dance floor. Just as with the repetition of
movements performed by dancers, she insisted, the pattern exuded by an object could be
traced as if it were unfolding on a ballroom floor (Marshall 2016, xvii). In visual
perception, the “rational spirits” of an observer witnessed the dance that is internal and
unique to an object and then replicated, or imitated, that dance for the brain. By dancing
the same dance, the mind comes to “know” the object. And an observer could never
“know” the object only through observation, but through this mimetic patterning of the
object. As the years progressed, Cavendish replaced the dance metaphor with the
language of “patterns” or “imitations” to more explicitly describe the visual process
(Marshall 2016, xvii).
By the time of Observations, Cavendish relied upon “imitation” and patterning to
explain the play of the senses, or how visual signals moved from the external world into
the internal mind. Literary scholar Lisa Walters considers Cavendish’s concept of
“patterning” as working counter-logically to ancient theories of vision in which force was
necessary for sight (2014b, 377). 10 In the Platonic extramission theory of vision—most

Force is a contentious issue in theories of vision. The Royal Society’s optics of
objectivity, in which the observer acts upon objects but is never acted upon, recalled
Platonic theories of vision. This similarity has led feminist literary critics to connect
thinkers from the Royal Society, such as Francis Bacon, with the concept of the “male
gaze.” As Walters explains: “Though Bacon suggests that scientists have not been able to
dominate Nature, she is none the less imagined as a female body to penetrate and violate
by male reason for the pursuit of knowledge. The male/female binary is utilized to
10
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notably presented in the Timaeus (Plato 2000)—the force of vision rested with the
observer: beams were thought to exude from the observer’s eyes in order to reach out and
“grab” the beams exuded from the object. In this process of reaching out to “grab” the
object in order to perceive it, the observer altered the nature of the object. By contrast,
Aristotle’s intromission theory of vision, as expounded in the De Anima (Aristotle 2016),
contended that the observer was completely passive and that the force in vision rested
with the external world. That is, beams from the object jumped into the eyes and mind of
the observer. The only thing an observer could do to halt this process was to close their
eyes.
Cavendish’s theory of optics, however, struck a balance between the two: objects
certainly exuded “patterns” (otherwise considered “beams”) and thus had agential force in
portraying how they were perceived, but the observer also maintained agency in that she
must consciously imitate this pattern in order to see or know the object. Vision, in this
schema, was not merely about projecting or receiving a static representation of the world,
but about dancing along with the world. Cavendish herself dispelled “transmission”
optical theories in Observations, asserting instead her “opinion . . . that the most rare and
subtlest parts in the animal sensitive organs, do pattern out the figures of exterior objects,
and that the perception of the exterior animal senses, to wit, sight, hearing, tasting,
touching, smelling, is certainly made by no other way, than by figuring and imitation”
(Cavendish 1666b, 174-175, emphasis added). In short, sensation, and how the brain

portray a relation between knowledge and sexual power. Power can be obtained over
Nature as man has power over woman” (Walters 2014a, 63).
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processes sensory information through perceptual processes, involved mimetic
interaction with the natural world. Unlike ancient theories of vision or the Royal Society’s
optics, which hinged upon artificial means to validate or provide factual “proof” for a now
expert observer, Cavendish’s optics consisted of visual perception based on patterning or
mimesis, on an embodied observer who was always entwined with or indebted to that
which she observed.
This use of mimesis to build an alternative theory of optics certainly involved a
conception of agency that extended beyond the bounds of the human for Cavendish.
During acts of vision or perception, the interplay between external and internal, agent
and object shifted:
When I say that the ‘exterior object is the agent; and the sentient body, the
patient’: I do not mean, that the object does chiefly work upon the sentient, or is
the immediate cause of the perception in the sentient body, and that the sentient
suffers the agent to act upon it; . . . . I am quite of a contrary opinion, to wit, that
the sentient body is the principal agent, and the external body the patient; for the
motions of the sentient in the act of perception, do figure out or imitate the
motions of the object, so that the object is but as a copy that is figured out, or
imitated by the sentient, which is the chief agent in all transforming and
perceptive actions that are made by way of patterning or imitation. (Cavendish
1666b, 18, emphasis added)
Placing both object and observer as acting agents in visual perception, Cavendish not only
brought these agents together in close proximity, but she also used mimesis as the
mechanism by which to understand sensory encounters, to understand the
communicative exchange between human and nonhuman matter. 11 And considering

This communicative exchange, Cavendish made clear, does not occur in
conscious, voluntary channels. As she put it, “The actions of imitation or patterning, are
different from the voluntary actions” of other bodily functions like “expulsion” (Cavendish
11
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Cavendish’s optics of mimetic patterning as a theory of rhetorical communication need
not seem anachronistic, especially considering that Cavendish herself explained
patterning as “the perpetual commerce and intercourse between parts and parts”
(Cavendish 1666b, 140, emphasis added). Thus, we can understand Cavendish’s use of
“imitation” and patterning as an expansion and redefinition of rhetorical mimesis for use
in scientific epistemologies, explaining ways of relation between human and nonhuman
matter.
That Cavendish initially conceived of this optics of patterning and the process of
visual perception as sensory mimesis through dance is telling. This metaphor of dance
was one of multiple valences for Cavendish that became more enriched with each
iteration of her optics, even once the language of dance, of explicit performance, fell away
and only the language of “patterns” and “imitation” remained. At its core, the metaphor
speaks to the insistence of partnerships in early modern English dances, partnerships in
which each partner had assigned steps but the freedom to perform those steps as they
desired. As Boyle explains: “While dances typically follow a certain pattern or set of rules,
they are performed by intelligent creatures who may choose whether or not to follow the
rules of the dance” (Boyle 2018, 68). With the interaction between humans and
nonhuman matter during vision described as a dance, nonhuman matter is ascribed a
degree of agency that counters the mechanistic metaphors of experimental philosophy in
which nature is depicted as a machine or a clock (Boyle 2018, 68).

1666b, 35). Patterning, instead, happens on a different register, often, she implied,
unbeknownst to the conscious mind.
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Cavendish’s optics, then, stood in stark contrast to other metaphysics and
scientific epistemologies of her time by privileging a woman’s way of interacting with the
world, a way of listening to and languaging alongside nonhuman matter. Hooke, of
course, with his microscope, would go on pave the road for microbiology, a field
necessary for the study of human diseases. Cavendish’s writings, admittedly, made no
such changes to histories of science, but her aims were not based in the establishment of
empirical facts as much as they were about how those facts were ascertained and who was
given authority and access to establish them. And it is worth noting that only in the wake
of feminist new materialisms, cognitive neuroscience, and the championing of alternative
epistemologies have Cavendish’s ideas begun to sound especially prescient. Detlefsen has
shown that Cavendish’s theories of nature presage at least “one contemporary feminist
account within the philosophy of science, that offered by Evelyn Fox Keller” (Detlefsen
2018, 73). Cavendish’s choice of the keyword “pattern” too is consistent with the work of
contemporary neuroscientists like Howard Gardner, Margaret Livingstone, and Semir
Zeki, all of whom study the visual brain. Gardner uses the language of “patterning” most
explicitly when he discusses how knowledge is stored neurally (Gardner 1983, 152), and
Zeki contends that the brain creates patterns from past visual experiences and then
interprets present sensory stimuli according to those patterns (Zeki 1999, 5-6). Further
still, Cavendish’s metaphor of the “pattern” animates and makes agential the building
blocks of matter, theories legitimized by feminist new materialisms and the findings of
quantum physics in the last several decades (Barad 2007; Bennett 2010). Now an
important concept for contemporary sciences, Cavendish’s turn to “patterning” allowed
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her to anticipate key premises in feminist science studies and envision the interaction
between human and nonhuman matter in scientific encounters in both its conceptual
and material valences through the rhetorical concept of mimesis.
The Rhetorical Effect of Optics as Mimetic Patterning
When Cavendish received the invitation to attend a Royal Society meeting in May
1667, she exemplified the confidence that came from her mimetic epistemology, from the
idea that objects seen as other, whether metaphorically or through the microscope, play
active rhetorical roles. As was mentioned at the onset, most scholars have considered
Cavendish’s natural philosophy too imaginative to be scientific and her visit to the Royal
Society too timid to be a success. Now, with the additional evidence of Cavendish’s
critique of the Royal Society, her overturning of early modern metaphysics, and her
mimetic optics, we may return to a critically imaginative reading of that visit, one that
allows us to consider the possibility that Cavendish recognized the mimetic dynamic at
play that day. In such a critically imaginative reading, it becomes less important whether
Cavendish was rhetorically persuasive and more important that we observe how she
turned to the rhetorical concept of mimesis for confidence in confronting the optics of
the Royal Society.
That is, knowing that members of the Royal Society were to place her “under the
microscope,” perhaps Cavendish presented herself before the experimental philosophers
as an object worthy of study and performed in such a way as to resist their being able to
know or understand her. Members of the Royal Society would study her like their
specimens: as a static object upon which to gaze, not as a living subject from which to
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learn. Literary scholar Kate Lilley once touted Cavendish as “an exemplary instance of
woman as spectacle” (Lilley 1992, ix). This role of spectacle, best captured through her
nickname, “Mad Madge,” was “dependent on the exhibition of herself for the benefit of an
audience,” argues D’Monte (2003, 120). Instead of trying to persuade Society members
that she was a reputable natural philosopher—an impossibility in their estimation—
Cavendish leaned into the role of “Mad Madge” because this position of other, she knew,
would demand attention, if not a response.
But it would also not be too bold to suggest that Cavendish exposed the limits of
the Royal Society’s optics: if an object is studied only beneath a microscope,
metaphorically or otherwise, there is no way to conclude its substance. Had Cavendish
spoken her mind that day, she likely would have slipped from being an object of study to
an object of ridicule. Through her performance of silence, she placed herself at a distance,
performing the role of object-under-study-by-experimental-philosophy. Even in her
theories of rhetoric, Cavendish understood that the body often speaks louder than words:
“It is true that there are more errors committed in speaking [than] in silence. . . . There is
an old saying, to talk much and well is seldom heard” (Cavendish 1655, Book I, Part i 52).
And whereas Cavendish’s theories may only recently be finding scholarly and scientific
resonances, her performance did, indeed, command attention. Weeks later, Royal Society
members were still talking about Cavendish’s presence at Arundel-house. In the early
weeks of June 1667, the Council proposed that gifts be extended to those who “had taken
pains in fitting the room for the late entertainment of the Duchess of Newcastle” (Royal
Society 1667). Given the widespread attention garnered by her visit, it is not too much a
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stretch of the imagination to suspect that this visit and Cavendish’s frequent publishing
on experimental philosophy inflected with contemplative, embodied ways of knowing
had ripple effects that allowed women to participate more frequently and confidently in
scientific conversations. After all, as Chelsea Redeker Milbourne and Sarah Hallenbeck
show, later iterations of the microscope, such as the pocket microscope of the eighteenthcentury, would allow women to become discoverers of nature and participants in a
science that was more “accessible, personal, and embodied” (Milbourne and Hallenbeck
2013, 412). Cavendish, it seems, anticipated, if not foreshadowed, feminist overturnings of
hegemonic scientific epistemologies.
The objective observer emerging around Hooke’s microscope in early modern
England excluded women from scientific ways of knowing in that it “placed less
importance on the embodied performances of the users and their personal reflections or
opinions about the scientific process” (Milbourne and Hallenbeck 2013, 418). 12 Cavendish
presents an instance of one who subverted that scientific tradition as it emerged, an
instance of a woman who invited other women to theorize alternative methods for
scientific discovery through her own remaking of agency and materialism. She offers an
early rhetorics of science in which alternative epistemologies—here, embodied and
intuitive ways of knowing—might critique mechanical, experimental processes. Perhaps
more pointedly, Cavendish’s optics, and the redefinition of rhetorical mimesis that

See Daston and Galison (2010) for an overview of the debate about the origins of
objectivity and the role played by Royal Society members in determining the evolution of
visual practices in scientific argumentation.
12
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enlivened it, offers a historical moment in which rhetoric offered tools for scientists to
think with, thus hinting at rhetorics in science, not just rhetorics of science.

39
Works Cited
Aït-Touati, Frédérique. 2011. Fictions of the Cosmos: Science and Literature in the
Seventeenth Century, translated by Susan Emanuel. Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press.
Ankers, Neil. 2003. “Paradigms and Politics: Hobbes and Cavendish Contrasted.” In A
Princely Brave Woman: Essays on Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle,
edited by Stephen Clucas, 242-254. Hampshire, England: Ashgate.
Aristotle. 2016. De Anima, translated by Christopher Shields. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Barad, Karen. 2007. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Battigelli, Anna. 2015. Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind. Lexington, KY: The
University Press of Kentucky.
Bennett, Jane. 2010. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press.
Birch, Thomas. 1756. The History of the Royal Society of London for Improving of Natural
Knowledge. Vol. 2. Internet Archive.
https://archive.org/details/historyofroyalso0002birc/page/178/mode/2up.
Bowerbank, Sylvia. 1984. “The Spider’s Delight: Margaret Cavendish and the ‘Female’
Imagination.” English Literary Renaissance 14 (3): 392-408.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6757.1984.tb00872.x.
Boyle, Deborah. 2018. The Well-Ordered Universe: The Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Broad, Jacqueline. 2011. “Is Margaret Cavendish Worthy of Study Today?” Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science 42: 457-461.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.02.004.
Cavendish, Margaret. 1653. Philosophical Fancies. Digital Cavendish.
http://digitalcavendish.org/complete-works/philosophical-fancies-1653/.
Cavendish, Margaret. 1655. The World’s Olio. Digital Cavendish.
http://digitalcavendish.org/complete-works/worlds-olio-1655/.
Cavendish, Margaret. 1663. Orations of Divers Sorts. HathiTrust.

40

Cavendish, Margaret. 1664. Philosophical Letters. Digital Cavendish.
http://digitalcavendish.org/resources/letters-in-the-philosophical-letters/.
Cavendish, Margaret. (1666b) 2001. Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, edited by
Eileen O’Neill. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Chico, Tita. 2006. “Minute Particulars: Microscopy and Eighteenth-Century Narrative.”
Mosaic 39 (2): 143-161. ProQuest.
Corbett, Edward P.J. 1971. “The Theory and Practice of Imitation in Classical Rhetoric.”
College Composition and Communication 22 (3): 243-250.
http://www.jstor.com/stable/356450.
Crawford, Julie. 2018. “Margaret Cavendish’s Books.” In Women’s Bookscapes in Early
Modern Britain, edited by Leah Knight, Micheline White, and Elizabeth Sauer, 91114. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Cunning, David. 2017. “Margaret Lucas Cavendish.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/margaret-cavendish/.
Cunning, David. 2019. Margaret Cavendish: Essential Writings. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Daston, Lorraine, and Peter Galison. 2010. Objectivity. New York, NY: Zone Books.
Detlefsen, Karen. 2007. “Reason and Freedom: Margaret Cavendish on the Order and
Disorder of Nature.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 89(2): 157-191.
https://doi.org/10.1515/AGPH.2007.008.
Detlefsen, Karen. 2018. “Margaret Cavendish on Laws and Order.” In Early Modern
Women on Metaphysics, edited by Emily Thomas, 72-91. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
D’Monté, Rebecca. 2003. “‘Making a Spectacle’: Margaret Cavendish and the Staging of
the Self.” In A Princely Brave Woman: Essays on Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, edited by Stephen Clucas, 109-126. Hampshire, England: Ashgate.
Elsely, Judith. 1990. “The Semiotics of Quilting: Discourse of the Marginalized.” PhD
Dissertation, University of Arizona. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/565534.
Fahnestock, Jeanne. 1999. Rhetorical Figures in Science. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.

41

Farrell, Thomas B. 1986. “Rhetorical Resemblance: Paradoxes of a Practical Art.” Quarterly
Journal of Speech 71(1): 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1080/00335638609383755.
Fisk, Anna. 2012. “‘To Make, and Make Again’: Feminism, Craft and Spirituality.” Feminist
Theology 20 (2): 160-174. https://doi.org/10.1177/0966735011425302.
Flannery, Maura C. 2011. “Quilting: A Feminist Metaphor for Scientific Inquiry.”
Qualitative Inquiry 7 (5): 628-645. https://doi.org/10.1177/107780040100700507.
Gardner, Howard. (1983) 2004. Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences, 20th
anniversary edition. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Gross, Alan. 2016. “The Limits of the Rhetorical Analysis of Science.” Poroi 12(1): 1-28.
https://doi.org/10.13008/2151-2957.1244.
Haskins, Ekaterina V. 2000. “Mimesis Between Poetics and Rhetoric: Performance Culture
and Civic Education in Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly
30 (3): 7-33. https://doi.org/10.1080/02773940009391180.
Havelock, Eric A. (1963) 1982. Preface to Plato. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hooke, Robert. (1665) 1987. Micrographia, or Some Physiological Descriptions of Minute
Bodies Made by Magnifying Glasses, facsimile edition. Lincolnwood, IL: Science
Heritage, Ltd.
Hutton, Sarah. 1997. “In Dialogue with Thomas Hobbes: Margaret Cavendish’s Natural
Philosophy.” Women’s Writing, 4(3): 421-432.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09699089700200024.
Hutton, Sarah. 2003. “Margaret Cavendish and Henry More.” In A Princely Brave Woman:
Essays on Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, edited by Stephen Clucas,
185-198. Hampshire, England: Ashgate.
Jack, Jordynn. 2009. “A Pedagogy of Sight: Microscopic Vision in Robert Hooke’s
Micrographia.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 95 (2): 192–209.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00335630902842079.
James, Susan. 2018. “‘Hermaphroditical Mixtures’: Margaret Cavendish on Nature and
Art.” In Early Modern Women on Metaphysics, edited by Emily Thomas, 31-48.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

42
Keller, Eve. 1997. “Producing Petty Gods: Margaret Cavendish’s Critique of Experimental
Science.” English Literary History 64 (2): 447–471.
https://doi.org/10.1353/elh.1997.0017.
Kennedy, George A. 1999. Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from
Ancient to Modern Times, 2nd edition. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North
Carolina Press.
Knellwolf, Christa. 2001. “Robert Hooke’s Micrographia and the Aesthetics of Empiricism.”
The Seventeenth Century 16 (1): 177-200. ProQuest.
Knight, Leah, Micheline White, and Elizabeth Sauer, editors. 2018. Women’s Bookscapes
in Early Modern Britain. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Lawson, Ian. 2015. “Bears in Eden, or This is Not the Garden You’re Looking For: Margaret
Cavendish, Robert Hooke and the Limits of Natural Philosophy.” The British
Journal for the History of Science 48 (4): 583-605.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007087415000588.
Lawson, Ian. 2016. “Crafting the Microworld: How Robert Hooke Constructed Knowledge
about Small Things.” Notes and Records: The Royal Society Journal of the History of
Science 70: 23-44. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsnr.2015.0057.
Lilley, Kate. 1992. Editor’s Introduction to The Description of a New World, Called the
Blazing World, by Margaret Cavendish. New York, NY: New York University Press.
Livingstone, Margaret. 2002. Vision and Art: The Biology of Seeing. New York, NY: Harry
N. Abrams.
Marshall, Eugene. 2016. Introduction to Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, by
Margaret Cavendish. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.
Milbourne, Chelsea Redeker, and Sarah Hallenbeck. 2013. “Gender, Material Chronotopes,
and the Emergence of the Eighteenth-Century Microscope.” Rhetoric Society
Quarterly 43 (5): 401-424. https://doi.org/10.1080/02773945.2013.828096.
Mintz, Samuel I. 1952. “The Duchess of Newcastle’s Visit to the Royal Society.” The Journal
of English and Germanic Philology 51 (2): 168–176. JSTOR.
Muckelbauer, John. 2003. “Imitation and Invention in Antiquity: An HistoricalTheoretical Revision." Rhetorica 21 (2): 61-88.

43
Nate, Richard. 2001. “‘Plain and Vulgarly Express’d’: Margaret Cavendish and the
Discourse of the New Science.” Rhetorica 19 (4): 403–417.
https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.2001.19.4.403.
O’Gorman, Ned. 2013. “Hobbes, Desire, and the Democratization of Rhetoric.” Advances
in the History of Rhetoric 16 (1): 1-28. https://doi.org/10.1080/15362426.2013.763737.
O’Neill, Eileen. 2005. “Early Modern Women Philosophers and the History of
Philosophy.” Hypatia 20 (3): 185-197. muse.jhu.edu/article/184990.
Pepys, Samuel. (1667) 1974. The Diary of Samuel Pepys, volume 8, edited by Robert
Latham and William Matthews. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Plato. 2000. Timaeus, edited by Donald J. Zeyl. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.
Popkin, Richard H. 1988. “Theories of Knowledge.” In The Cambridge History of
Renaissance Philosophy, edited by Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard
Kessler, and Jill Kraye, 668-684. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rogers, John. 1996. The Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry, and Politics in the Age of
Milton. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Royal Society of London. n.d. “History of the Royal Society.” Accessed December 5, 2017.
https://royalsociety.org/about-us/history/.
Royal Society of London. 1667. June 3, 1667, Meeting Minutes, Repository GB 117 The
Royal Society, Ref. No. CMO/1/131. Accessed July 22, 2020.
Royster, Jacqueline Jones, and Gesa E. Kirsch. 2012. Feminist Rhetorical Practices: New
Horizons for Rhetoric, Composition, and Literacy Studies. Carbondale, IL: Southern
Illinois University Press.
Sarasohn, Lisa T. 1984. “A Science Turned Upside Down: Feminism and the Natural
Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish.” Huntington Library Quarterly 47 (4): 289–307.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3817365.
Sarasohn, Lisa T. 2003. “Leviathan and the Lady: Cavendish’s Critique of Hobbes in the
Philosophical Letters.” In Authorial Conquests: Essays on Genre in the Writings of
Margaret Cavendish, edited by Line Cottegnies and Nancy Weitz, 40-58. Cranbury,
NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
Skinner, Quentin. 1999. “Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State.” The
Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1): 1-29. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00063.

44
Skouen, Tina, and Ryan J. Stark. 2015. Introduction to Rhetoric and the Early Royal
Society: A Sourcebook. Leiden: Brill. ProQuest Ebrary.
Smith, A. Mark. 2015. From Sight to Light: The Passage from Ancient to Modern Optics.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Stark, Ryan John. 1999. “Margaret Cavendish and Composition Style.” Rhetoric Review 17
(2): 264-281. JSTOR.
Sutherland, Christine Mason. 1997. “Aspiring to the Rhetorical Tradition: A Study of
Margaret Cavendish.” In Listening to Their Voices: The Rhetorical Activities of
Historical Women, edited by Molly Meijer Wertheimer, 255-271. Columbia, SC:
University of South Carolina Press.
Walters, Lisa. 2014a. Margaret Cavendish: Gender, Science, and Politics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Walters, Lisa. 2014b. “Optics and Authorship in Margaret Cavendish’s Observations and
The Blazing World.” Viator 45 (3): 377–93.
https://doi.org/10.1484/J.VIATOR.5.102933.
Walton, Craig. 1987. “Hobbes on the Natural and the Artificial.” Hobbes’s ‘Science of
Natural Justice,’ edited by C. Walton and P.J. Johnson, 71-88. Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Weeks, Sophie. 2007. “Francis Bacon and the Art-Nature Distinction.” Ambix 54 (2): 101129. https://10.1179/174582307X212332.
Whitaker, Katie. 2003. Mad Madge: The Extraordinary Life of Margaret Cavendish,
Duchess of Newcastle, the First Woman to Live By Her Pen. New York, NY: Basic
Books.
Witkowski, Jacqueline. 2014. “Ever Present, Never Presented: Suzanne Lacy, Feminism
and Quilting.” Master’s Thesis, The University of British Columbia.
https://doi.org/10.14288/1.0166975.
Wu, Hui. 2005. “The Paradigm of Margaret Cavendish: Reading Women’s Alternative
Rhetorics in a Global Context.” In Calling Cards: Theory and Practice in the Study of
Race, Gender, and Culture, edited by Jacqueline Jones Royster and Ann Marie
Mann Simpkins, 171-185. Ithaca, NY: State University of New York Press.
Zeki, Semir. 1999. Inner Vision: An Exploration of Art and the Brain. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.

